Abortion is the death of fetus. Who has the right to kill?
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There is a conservative point of view – there cannot be any moral justification for abortion. Abortion is a direct intended killing. Embryo from the moment of conception is considered to be a personality which must be ascribed the main volume of the human rights – and first of all the right for life. Naturally, there is a position which prohibits any abortion in any case. And there are many advocates who acknowledge the right for abortion when there is a direct threat for the woman’s life or when the pregnancy is consequence of rape or incest. And here the main role plays the religion. Of course, it is recognized and calls for absolute respect. However, too often, people who are thinking in the direction of religion, they pass the real aspects of the problem.
There is another position again. Mary Anne Warren has interesting points of view. She states that in the basis of moral decisions about the problem of abortion there are several questions which are tied very tightly. First, what quality makes us admit that some creature is a man and therefore to include it into the moral community where its members have the equal rights? Second, what is the moral community? Is it always necessary to include all human creatures into it?
The traditional conclusion of abortion’s antagonist is in the following way – 1) it is forbidden to kill the innocent man; 2) the fetus is the innocent man; 3) therefore, it is forbidden to kill fetus. Mary is stating that the word “human” in the first and second positions is used in the different senses. In the first sense “human” is considered as a personality and as a member of the moral community. In the second sense, as a representative of biological species who has a set of genes which are typical exactly to homo sapiens. Must any genetic human obligatory be considered as personality? And vice versa, must any personality be a human in the genetic sense of word?
So, there is an experiment – to imagine the astronaut who landed on the unexplored planet and found out the population of creatures on it which are not like somebody or something which he didn’t see before this moment. How would he behave from the side of morality? If he identifies these creatures with inorganic nature or animals, then there will be quite morally hunting on them with the goal to use them as a food, as the scientific examination or getting necessary materials for flight. But there is another opportunity. The astronaut can include them into the moral community of people like him and in relation to them there will be necessary to apply the commandment “don’t kill”. In what exactly can he see the main likeness with him? Of course, genetically the alien are different from people. Here the likeness is hardly possible. But can this difference be a reason for not including them into the moral community? No. Those values, according to which he will be making the differentiation, are in the other plane. Astronaut differentiates himself from animals and inanimate objects first of all by ascribing such quality as mind (intellect). That’s why the solving of the question about including the alien into the moral community will depend on that fact, how much can they be our fellows “by mind” and not by genotype.
Warren sorts out 6 main properties which are more or less accurately describe the state of reasonableness, the presence of mind – sentience, emotionality, reason, the capacity to communicate, self-awareness and moral agency (White, p. 118)
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